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THE BUDGETARY AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
EFFECTS OF REVENUE ASSURANCE: 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
 One of the more intriguing alternatives 
under consideration for the 1995 Farm Bill 
is the “Iowa Plan.”  This idea originated 
with a group of Iowa's farm and commodity 
organizations.  It is receiving increased 
attention from national farm organizations, 
academics, and politicians.1  The basic 
premise is very simple.  Rather than the 
current mixture of target prices, disaster 
payments, set-aside provisions and crop 
insurance, the government would underwrite 
a program that guarantees producers a 
certain percentage of recent revenues.  The 
idea has much intuitive appeal because 
farmers (and their bankers) would be assured 
of a certain revenue figure regardless of 
what happens to prices or yields.   
 Because current programs often result in 
large deficiency payments when yields are 
also high, and low deficiency payments in 
drought years, there is a sense that money 
arrives when it is not needed and fails to 
arrive when it is needed.  Consequently, it 
appears possible that with revenue assurance 
the government might cut its costs while 
improving the welfare of farmers. 
 With these ideas in mind, the Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development 
(CARD) has recently begun an in-depth 
analysis of the Iowa Plan.  The first part of 
this project has been completed and is now 
                                         
    1  The idea itself is not particularly new.  It 
has been suggested by authors of previous farm 
bills, and is a similar concept to Canada's 
Guaranteed Revenue Insurance Program.  What 
is new about the Iowa plan is its timing and the 
grassroots support it has among producer 
groups. 
available. The paper is CARD Working 
Paper 95-WP 130, “The Budgetary and 
Resource Allocation Effects of Revenue 
Assurance,” by David A. Hennessy, Bruce 
A. Babcock, and Dermot J. Hayes.  Please 
refer to that paper for more details of the 
analysis.  Here we summarize some of its 
more important findings. 
 
 The Importance of Contract Details 
 Before evaluating the impact of revenue 
assurance, detail is required on how exactly 
the program would be implemented.  
However, before policymakers can agree on 
the details, they need to know more about 
the likely impact of the proposal itself.  In an 
attempt to get around this “catch-22” 
situation, our first look at the program is to 
examine how a representative Iowa corn-
soybean farmer would respond to various 
contract specifications.  One advantage of 
this farm-level focus is that we have 
excellent information on how yields and 
prices have moved over time as well as on 
how rotations influence yields and costs.  
Thus, we can match up details about the 
representative farm with details about the 
revenue assurance program.  A second 
advantage of this farm-level approach is that 
we can get an accurate idea of what 
alternative revenue assurance programs will 
cost and the magnitude of the associated 
program benefits. 
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Contract Details 
a.  Should revenue assurance be offered 
on a whole farm level, or should it be 
offered on a crop-by-crop basis? 
We can make good intuitive arguments for 
either approach and both are compared here. 
 
b.  Should county average yields or farm-
specific yields be used when calculating 
revenue?  There is a trade-off between the 
accuracy of the program and the amount of 
bureaucracy required to run it.  We compare 
the government costs and benefits to 
producers of both programs. 
 
c.  What percentage of expected revenue 
should the program assure? 
The answer depends in part on how much 
the government can spend and the level of 
expected benefits at the different assurance 
levels. We ran the numbers for 70, 80, 90, 
and 100 percent revenue assurance but 
report only on the 80 and 100 percent 
options. 
 
d.  Should revenues be calculated 
according to what the farmer actually 
plants or on what has been grown 
historically?   
Here the answer is less straightforward. 
Using actual plantings would cause some 
producers to adopt high-risk crops and 
cropping practices, and consequently the 
program itself would distort the market.  Our 
sense is that revenue assurance was 
proposed to remove market disruptions and, 
consequently, we used historical plantings to 
calculate revenues.  Note, however, that we 
do use actual (simulated) yields and prices to 
calculate per acre revenues. 
 
e.  How should producer benefits be 
measured? 
Revenue assurance and deficiency payment 
schemes are put in place to reduce the 
amount of risk associated with farming.  If 
risk were not an issue, the government could 
simplify things greatly and merely write 
checks.  The way we incorporate the effect 
of risk is:  We calculate the amount of 
money a typical producer would accept for 
certain in exchange for the risky outcome 
they might otherwise face.  For example, 
suppose a farmer expects to make an  
average of $50,000 per year raising hogs, but 
would be just as happy making $45,000 per 
year raising hogs if all the revenue 
uncertainty associated with raising hogs 
were eliminated.  Then we can say that the 
certainty equivalent of a $50,000 per year 
hog operation is $45,000.  Here $50,000 is 
the “expected revenue” and $45,000 is the 
“certainty equivalent” returns. 
 
The Representative Farm 
 We chose a 500-acre corn-soybean farm 
in Sioux County.  Results are presented for 
two producers who vary according to the 
level of risk they wish to face.  The less risk 
averse producer is more willing to trade 
increased risk for increased expected returns 
than the more risk averse producer.  This 
trade-off is accomplished by moving away 
from the benefits of a corn-soybean rotation 
towards a rotation that emphasizes the 
program crop, corn.  At first glance it would 
seem that corn is actually less risky than 
soybeans because of government subsidies, 
but corn yields and corn prices are more 
variable than soybean yields and prices, and 
crop diversification leads to substantial 
decreases in the variability of farm returns.  
 The farm is enrolled in the target price 
program and both types of producers are 
assumed to purchase federal crop insurance. 
Expected harvest time sales prices are $2.21 
per bushel for corn and $6.17 per bushel for 
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soybeans.  Base yield is 112.1 bushels per 
acre.  Expected yield this year is 137.6 
bushels per acre when corn follows beans 
and 124.5 bushels per acre in continuous 
corn.  We used production costs estimated 
by Iowa State University farm management 
extension. 
 
Results 
 Table 1 presents estimates of the effects 
of moving from the present program to a 
free market and to revenue assurance.  The 
basic assumption behind these results is that 
the producer chooses acreage to maximize 
certainty equivalent returns.  Under the 
current program the proportion of acreage 
devoted to corn depends on the assumed 
level of risk aversion.  The less risk averse 
producer plants significantly more corn than 
soybeans and the more risk averse producer 
essentially plants under a corn-soybean 
rotation.  Only farm-level revenue assurance 
results are presented in Table 1.  Revenue 
assurance results based on county average 
revenue are provided in the full study. 
 Under the free market option and all the 
revenue assurance options, the producer 
finds that a corn-soybean rotation is optimal. 
Thus, the first result is that for this farm, 
revenue assurance results in the same 
acreage allocation as would occur under the 
free market scenario.  That is, there are no 
distortionary effects of revenue assurance. 
 There are two distortionary effects of the 
current program.  First, productive land is 
idled: 22 acres for the less risk averse 
producer and 17 acres for the more risk 
averse producer (who has less corn base).  
Second, for the less risk averse producer, 
corn deficiency payments induce more corn 
production.  That is, this farmer finds it 
optimal to “farm the program” by increasing 
land planted to corn. 
 Expected government costs of revenue 
assurance are substantially less than under 
the current program.  For example, 
government costs under 80 percent crop-
specific assurance are reduced by 92 percent 
for the less risk averse producer and by 90 
percent for the more risk averse producer. 
Under 100 percent crop-specific assurance, 
costs are 55 percent less than the current 
program for the less risk averse producer 
and are 44 percent less for the more risk 
averse producer.  The cost reduction is even 
greater under whole farm assurance. 
 Producer certainty equivalent returns 
also fall under revenue assurance, but by a 
lesser amount than the drop in government 
costs.  This suggests that the efficiency of 
government payments increases.  For 
example, the current program raises the 
certainty equivalent returns of the less risk 
averse producer by about $14,000 over the 
free market level at a cost of more than 
$25,000.  That is, it costs about $1.80 for 
each one dollar rise in certainty equivalent 
returns.  In contrast, under 100 percent 
whole farm revenue assurance, certainty 
equivalent returns of the less risk averse 
producer increase by $10,757 at a cost of 
$9,498, which implies that each dollar 
transferred to producers increases certainty 
equivalent returns by $1.13.  
 The efficiency increase with revenue 
assurance is even more pronounced for the 
more risk averse producer.  The current 
program increases certainty equivalent 
returns by about one dollar for each dollar 
transferred.  But under revenue assurance, 
each dollar transferred raises certainty 
equivalent returns by $1.69 under 100 
percent crop-specific revenue assurance, by 
$1.97 under 100 percent whole farm revenue 
assurance, by $2.61 under 80 percent crop-
specific revenue assurance, and by $5.19 
under 80 percent whole farm revenue 
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assurance.  The reason why the efficiency of 
government payments is so much higher 
under revenue assurance relative to the 
current program is that revenue assurance 
only pays when revenue is low, which 
implies that the benefit of the payment is 
high.  In contrast, the current program may 
make large deficiency payments when 
revenue from the market is also high. 
 
A Note on Moral Hazard 
 Much debate has gone into the issue of 
whether a revenue assurance program would 
cause farmers to change their behavior to 
take advantage of the program.  (Would the 
program be a hazard for the morals of 
farmers?)  The more we looked at this issue 
the less important it became.  For example, 
if we use county-level yields and fix the base 
acreage then there is nothing that producers 
can do to cheat even if they want to.  If we 
use individual yields, then it is possible but 
highly unlikely that farmers would “farm the 
program.”  Farmers might be tempted to cut 
fertilizer costs in years when prices are so 
low that they fully expect a payment on 
revenue assurance.  However, as we 
discovered in the results discussed here, the 
chances of this occurring are very small.  
Also, we know from other research that it 
almost always pays to choose the correct 
amount of fertilizer.  Please refer to CARD 
Working Paper 94-WP 127, “Input Demand 
Under Revenue Assurance,” by Bruce A. 
Babcock and David A. Hennessy, for more 
details about these results. 
 There are program details that would 
raise moral hazard issues.  For example, a 
100 percent revenue assurance program, 
based on farm-specific yields and current 
(rather than historic) planting patterns, 
would tempt some farmers to behave 
irresponsibly.  These problems, however, 
can be eliminated by using common sense in 
the program design.  We do not anticipate 
any real moral hazard problems with 
revenue assurance so long as the proportion 
assured remains below about 85 percent, and 
so long as historic rather than current 
acreage patterns are used. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 Revenue assurance would allow for 
much lower levels of government spending 
on agriculture, would remove the distortions 
associated with existing programs, and 
would dramatically improve the efficiency 
with which government agricultural 
programs are run.  Producer welfare, on the 
other hand, would decline under revenue 
assurance when compared with the existing 
program, except at a 100 percent coverage 
level.  At a 100 percent coverage level 
certainty equivalent returns are only slightly 
below the level under current programs but 
the corresponding government costs are cut 
approximately in half.  If current proposals 
to reduce government spending on 
agriculture by decreasing deficiency 
payments were to pass, then revenue 
assurance would become an attractive 
alternative to current programs operated at a 
reduced support level.
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Table 1.  Planting decisions, certainty equivalent returns, and expected government costs under    
              alternative government programs 
         Corn    Soybean       Government 
Program     Acreage   Acreage   CERa         Costs 
 
Less Risk Averse Producer 
 
Current Program     311       167    $76,461     $25,141 
 
Free Market      250       250    $62,490             $0 
 
Revenue Assurance 
 
 100% Crop Specific    250       250    $74,813      $11,178 
 
 100% Whole Farm    250       250    $73,247       $9,498 
 
 80% Crop Specific    250       250    $65,001       $2,024 
 
 80% Whole Farm     250       250    $63,618          $850 
 
More Risk Averse Producer 
 
Current Program     239        244    $70,668       $15,728 
 
Free Market      250        250    $55,199               $0 
 
Revenue Assurance 
 
 100% Crop Specific    250       250    $70,038        $8,768 
 
 100% Whole Farm    250       250    $67,378        $6,188 
 
 80% Crop Specific    250       250    $59,584        $1,679 
 
 80% Whole Farm     250       250    $56,440           $239 
a Certainty equivalent returns.
 
 
